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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
If Congress does find it necessary to legislate in order to protect the public
policies embodied in the antitrust laws, a bill similar to that proposed by Senator
Long would be preferable to the proposals of Representative Celler. Although
in the instance of some statutes, as in Tank Truck and similar cases, 188 the
relevant public policies will be equally frustrated by inadvertent and purposeful
violations, this is certainly not true in the case of the antitrust laws, and if
treble damage payments should be non-deductible in any situation (and it is by
no means clear that they should), only those payments arising out of "hard-
core" criminal violations should be disallowed. Also, since S. 3650 deals solely
with the deductibility aspect of treble damage payments, Congress, if it is
genuinely concerned with having the treble damage suit maintain its current
importance in the general scheme of antitrust enforcement, should consider the
possibility of non-income treatment for at least part of the treble damage pro-
ceeds received by the private antitrust suitor.
THE TAX TREATMENT OF VOLUNTARY DEATH BENEFITS
I. INTRODUCTION
Upon the death of a valued employee, an employer will occasionally make
a substantial payment to the employee's widow.' On an inspection of the reso-
lution authorizing the payment, it may appear to be motivated by gratitude
for years of faithful service and inspired by a magnanimous desire to give
assistance to the decedent's family. A more careful investigation, however, will
often reveal some less noble aspects of the transaction. The employer may
claim a deduction for the payment as a business expense on his tax return,
implying that the payment was more necessary than gratuitous. He may also
use it as an inducement to greater productivity by his other employees, who
are at least impliedly led to believe that on their deaths their families will be
given similar benefits. These and other factors must be sifted through and
weighed by the court2 in order to determine whether or not the payment was
a gift and therefore excludable by the widow from her gross income for income
tax purposes,3 and whether or not, and to what extent, the payment is deduct-
ible by the employer as a business expense.4
133. See Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
1. See generally Yohlin, Payments to Widows of Employees or Executives, in Taxation
of Deferred Executive and Employee Compensation 82 (Sellin ed. 1960) (hereinafter cited
as Yohlin]; Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 520 (1964); Hauser, Voluntary Corporate Payments to
Widows, 44 Taxes 110 (1966); Yohlin, Payments to Widows of Employees, 40 Taxes 208
(1962); Note, Payments to Widows of Corporate Executives and Employees--Gifts or
Income? 49 Va. L. Rev. 74 (1963).
2. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 288 (1960).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 102(a). "General Rule. Gross income does not include the
value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." Ibid. This provision was
previously contained in Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b)(3), 53 Stat. 10.
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a). "In general. There shall be allowed as a deduction
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Numerous problems have arisen in the frequent struggles among the recipi-
ents of the payments, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and the employers.
Not the least of these problems has been the possibility of both tax-free gift
treatment for the widow and a deductible business expense for the employer
in the same transaction.5
II. GIFT TREATmENT FOR THE WIDOW
A. Developnents Under tMe 1939 Code
The Commissioner's early treatment of such payments was favorable to the
recipient, perhaps for reasons of public policy6 at a time when bona fide pension
plans were rare and social security non-existent. In 1914, the payments were
ruled gratuitous and thus tax-exempt,7 and in 1921, this position was re-
affirmed.8 Then, in 1939, the Commissioner issued ruling I.T. 3329,9 which
was to cause numerous and recurrent adverse court decisions in the years
to come."'
This ruling stated with regard to death benefits that:
[P]ayments made by a corporation ...not in excess of the decedent's salary are
properly deductible by the payor corporation as ordinary and necessary business
expenses.
The amounts constitute gifts to [the widow] . . and are, therefore, not taxable
income to her. . . .When an alloNance is paid by an organization to which the
recipient has rendered no services, the amount is deemed to be a gift or gratuity
and is not subject to Federal income tax in the hands of the recipient."1
I.T. 3329 and the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bogardus v.
Commissioner'= together insured the widow relatively tax-free treatment of
these payments over the next two decades. 13 In the Bogardus case a substantial
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business .... "1 Ibid.
5. "The taxing statute does not make nondeductibility by the transferor a condition on
the 'gift' exclusion .... " Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 US. 278, 287 (1960).
6. See Yohlin 83.
7. T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259, 267-68 (1914).
8. O.D. 1017, 5 Cum. Bull. 101 (1921).
9. 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 153.
10. See Note, 49 Va. L. Rev. 74, 80 (1963).
11. 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 153, 154.
12. 302 U.S. 34 (1937). An earlier Supreme Court decision involving a determination
of whether a corporate employer's payment of an officer's income tax was compensation or
a gift had been resolved in favor of the Commissioner. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). There, the Court held that "the payment for services, even
though entirely voluntary, was nevertheless compensation within the statute." Id. at 730. The
factual question presented in that holding, however, was clearly enough a case of remunera-
tion for services rendered that the Court's decision had little or no adverse effect on subse-
quent cases involving bona fide gratuitous payments to widows.
13. The next adverse decision in a case containing substantial evidence favorable to the
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portion of the assets of the Universal Corporation were acquired by its share-
holders prior to the sale of the corporation to the United Gasoline Corporation.
These shareholders formed a new corporation, named Unopco, for the purpose
of managing those assets. The employees of Universal were no longer con-
nected with the shareholders of Unopco, but these shareholders felt indebted
to those employees, past and present, for the success of their original invest-
ment in Universal. To show that gratitude, they conferred monetary gifts on
many of the employees. These payments were designated gifts, although the
words "honorarium" and "bonus" were also used, and the resolution granting
them specifically stated that they were not consideration for, but rather in
recognition of, past services. Unopco did not attempt to deduct these pay-
ments as business expenses. The Court, noting that Unopco was under no legal
or moral obligation to make the payments,14 held that they were tax-free gifts.
The exact words used by the donor were deemed inconclusive as to what
treatment should be accorded the payments by the courts, 15 but rather, "since
intention must govern, [the court] ... must consider the word used in the light
of the intention."' This question of intention, the center of the Court's test,
was termed a mixed one of both law and fact,17 which provided a broad scope
for appellate review in later cases. 8 Having held that payments made in the
context of such strong business overtones could nevertheless be gifts, the Court
concluded that "a gift is none the less a gift because inspired by gratitude
for the past faithful service of the recipient,"'1 a phrase which was to present
an extremely difficult obstacle for the Internal Revenue Service to overcome
in subsequent litigation.
The danger that unfair advantage might be taken of the liberal policy
fostered in Bogardus and adopted by the Commissioner in I.T. 3329 did not
become obvious until ten years after the promulgation of the latter. In Louise
K. Aprilt, the widow of a deceased corporate officer inherited her husband's
widow was Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, 35 T.C. 65 (1960). This holding was reversed
and the case remanded, Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962), to enable
the widow to amend her pleading to comply with the Duberstein criteria, which had been
promulgated after this action originated. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278
(1960).
14. 302 U.S. at 41.
15. Id. at 42-44.
16. Id. at 43.
17. Id. at 39.
18. This scope was later narrowed in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290-91
(1960), where it was determined that the question of intention is basically one of fact.
This determination is in accord with the dissent in the Bogardus decision. 302 U.S. at 45.
19. Id. at 44.
20. 13 T.C. 707 (1949). The liberal view taken of gifts at the time is evidenced by Hel-
vering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943), where a forgiveness of indebtedness
was treated as a gift. There the Court said, "the fact that the motives leading to the
cancellations were those of business or even selfish, if it be true, is not significant. The for-
giveness was gratuitous, a release of something to the debtor for nothing, and sufficient to
make the cancellation here gifts within the statute." Id. at 331. That decision was ap-
parently overruled in Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949).
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stock, and was elected president and made a director of the corporation, al-
though her duties were ministerial and consumed very little time. The corpora-
tion had only three stockholders. Thereafter the widow continued to receive
her deceased husband's salary for two years in recognition of her hubsand's
services. Upon the expiration of this period, the corporation put her on the
regular payroll. The Commissioner urged that the payments during the last
three months of the two-year period be treated as part of the widow's gross
income, either as remuneration for services or disguised dividends.2 1 The tax
court refused to adopt this contention. Noting the lack of obligation, either
moral or legal, and the obvious intention of complying with I.T. 3329, it
found that the payments constituted a gift and were thus not subject to the
income tax22
After a few futile attempts to overturn the result of Aprill,23 the Commis-
sioner acquiesced in the holding of that case as it applied to voluntary death
payments made prior to January 1, 195124 and issued a new ruling, I.T. 4 0 2 7,m
to supplant I.T. 3329, hoping to establish control over the situation in the future.
Under I.T. 4027, where services had been rendered to the employer and where
the payment was made "in consideration" thereof, I.T. 3329 would not apply
and the payments would be included as part of the recipient's gross income.
And in 1951, in order to ameliorate another inequitable situation,2 0 Congress
amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to grant a $5,000 exclusion from
gross income for death benefits paid pursuant to a contractual obligation.ar
This statute was interpreted by some as specifying death benefits paid pursuant
to contractual obligation to be the only type of death benefit where even a
partial exclusion from gross income would be permissible.2 However, it did
21. Louise K. April1, 13 T.C. 707, 711 (1949).
22. Ibid.
23. E.g., Alice M. Madarlane, 19 T.C. 9 (1952). The Commissioner later acquiesced in
the holding of this case for all payments received prior to January 1, 1951. 19S3-1 Cum. Bull.
5.
24. 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 1. This acquiescence was subsequently withdrawn. 1957-2 Cum.
Bull. 8.
25. 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 9. This ruling purported to revoke O.D. 1017, S Cum. Bull. 101
(1921), mentioned at note 8 supra and accompanying text, and to modify I.T. 3329. It stated,
inter alia, that "payments made by an employer to the widow of a deceased officer or em-
ployee ... are includible in the gross income of the widow for Federal income tax purposes."
1950-2 Cum. Bull. at 11. The ruling was based on Varnedoe v. Allen, 158 F.2d 467 (Sth
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 821 (1947), and Sutro v. United States, 42-2 U.S. Tax.
Cas. 9523 (NJ). Cal. 1942). These cases, however, are distinguishable from those the Com-
missioner sought to affect by his ruling. The Varnedoe case involved a widow's payment
which was required under a Georgia statute. In the Sutro case, the employer had a legal
obligation to make the payment under an insurance plan guaranteed by the corporation.
26. Since payments to a decedent's family by his employer are analogous to insurance
benefits when prompted by contractual duty, it was inequitable that they should not receive
treatment similar to life insurance payments. See Note, 49 Va. L. Rev. 74, 82-83 (1963).
27. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 302(a), 65 Stat. 483. The effective date of this
amendment was also January 1, 1951.
28. See Yohlin 86.
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not have this anticipated result in the area of gifts to the decedent's family,
although the statute does attain importance when viewed in conjunction with
a later statutory treatment of the death benefit exclusion, in which the require-
ment of contractual liability to make the payment was eliminated.2 D
The first cases decided after I.T. 4027 was promulgated simply ignored it
and applied previously enunciated principles.30 When the ruling was first sub-
jected to judicial scrutiny in 1955, however, the Commissioner's position was
not vindicated. In Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom,3l the tax court held that I.T.
4027 applied only where the payments are actually in consideration of the past
services of the decedent and that the normal payment "in recognition" of the
decedent's services was still governed by the Aprill decision. The Hlellstrom
holding rendered I.T. 4027 meaningless. However, the passage of the 1954
Code gave the Commissioner some new support for his position.3 2
B. Internal Revenue Code of 1954
The 1954 Code eliminated the previously-discussed requirement 3 of a con-
tractual obligation on the part of the employer to pay the death benefit in order
that the recipient might qualify for a $5,000 exclusion from gross income.0 "
The change was apparently made to rectify the inequitable situation in which a
widow or other survivor received a death benefit which, although voluntary and
thus not qualifying for the $5,000 exclusion under prior law,"5 was determined not
to be a gift and thus not entitled to even partial exclusion from gross income.80
It was believed that under the new provision it would no longer be possible for
29. See notes 33-41 infra and accompanying text.
30. E.g., Marie G. Haskell, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 788 (1955); Ruth Hahn, 13 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 308 (1954).
31. 24 T.C. 916 (1955).
32. See Yohlin 88 n.15 for similar cases lost by the Commissioner. Finally, in 1958,
the Commissioner decided not to litigate any more of these cases (unless involving a dis-
guised dividend or other device which had supposedly never been sanctioned by the courts)
arising under the law prior to the 1954 Code. Rev. Rul. 58-613, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 914.
33. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
34. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(b)(1), (2)(A). "Gross income does not include
amounts received (whether in a single sum or otherwise) by the beneficiaries or the estate
of an employee, if such amounts are paid by or on behalf of an employer and are paid by
reason of the death of the employee. (2) . . . (A) ...The aggregate amounts excludable
under paragraph (1) ...shall not exceed $5,000." Ibid.
35. This type of situation could arise in many of the widow's cases. For example, If
it was found that the employer had an informal plan of paying such benefits, the payment
to the widow would not be a gift. Simpson v. United States, 261 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 944 (1959). The employer would, however, be under a severe moral
obligation to make the payment, and this would be nearly the equivalent of a contractual
or legal obligation. However, the widow would be denied the $5,000 exclusion under the
old law.
36. See H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1954). "Restricting the exemption
to benefits paid under a contract discriminates against those who receive benefits where
this contractual obligation does not exist." Ibid.
[Vol. 35
DEATH BENEFITS
the widow to obtain tax-free status for any death benefits to the extent that they
exceeded $5,000. 3 7 The first case to be decided under the 1954 Code, however,
held to the contrary. In Reed v. United States,38 the widow of the deceased
chairman of the board of the employer corporation sought to recover income
taxes assessed and paid on payments made to her by the corporation subsequent
to her husband's death and in " 'recognition of [his] ... past services ....
Although there had been six similar occasions in the past when the corporation
had made payments to widows of the other employees and officers, the court
found that there was no informal plan which would bar the widow from tax-
free treatment4° and rendered judgment in her favor. The court disagreed with
the Commissioner's contention that such gifts were includable in gross income,
subject only to the $5,000 exclusion for death benefits, under the 1954 Code.41
The result of the court's decision was that the questions of gifts and of exclu-
sions from gross income were to be determined separately, and that if a gift
was made out the exclusion question would become irrelevant as the payment
would already be entirely excluded from gross income.
The Commissioner had again failed to convince the courts that the allowance
of gift treatment should be restricted. Nevertheless, he declared that the Reed
holding would not be followed in future cases.42 And the courts were soon to
accept the substance of the Commissioner's position. This change was effected
not by the Commissioner's diligent pursuit of the argument advanced in the
Reed case, but through the unexpected assistance furnished by the Supreme
Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein.m4 3
C. The Duberstein Decision
Four years prior to Duberstein, the Supreme Court, in Commissioner v. Lo-
Bue,44 while not discussing a widow's benefit, decided that gains received
37. There were dicta to that effect in two subsequent federal court cases which were
decided under the 1939 Code. Bounds v. United States, 262 F2d 876, 878 n.2 (4th Cir.
1958); Rodner v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 233, 237 (S.DN.Y. 1957). The Commissioner
took the same position when he ruled that employee death benefits were "controlled by
section 101(b) of the Code, under which a maximum of $5,000 is excludable from gross
income, and . . . the gift exclusion provisions of section 102 of the Code are inapplicable
to any part of such payments." Rev. Rul. 60-326, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 32.
38. 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 277 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960).
39. Id. at 206.
40. Id. at 207. No established plan could be made out, the court held, because the cor-
poration "has treated each case individually and has followed no regular practice as to the
amount paid, the method of determining the amount paid, or the period during which the
payments were made." Ibid.
41. Id. at 209. See also notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
42. Rev. Rul. 60-326, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 32. But in 1962, the Commissioner finally
acquiesced in the Reed holding and admitted that a payment which qualifies as a gift under
§ 102(a) is completely excludable and does not fall under section 101. Rev. Rul. 62-102,
1962-2 Cum. Bull. 37, 38.
43. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
44. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
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through timely exercise of a stock option granted by an employer did not con-
stitute a gift under the statute and emphasized that to be a gift a benefit must
be conferred with a "detached and disinterested generosity. ' 45 This require-
ment was adopted by Duberstein46 and was to prove a major stumbling block
in subsequent litigation to recipients of gratuitous death benefits seeking gift
treatment.4
7
The Court in the Duberstein case was faced with apparently conflicting de-
cisions in the Second and Sixth Circuits.48 The Sixth Circuit had decided that
an automobile, given in appreciation of fruitful business leads conveyed to the
donor by the taxpayer, was a gift under the internal revenue statute.4 The
Second Circuit, faced with the question of whether a "gratuity" given by Trinity
Church in New York City to its retiring comptroller and president of its wholly-
owned operating subsidiary in appreciation of services rendered was a gift or
part of gross income, determined that the payment was includable in the tax-
payer's gross income. 50 The Supreme Court, in discussing the problems raised,
reviewed prior decisional law and noted several important factors in determining
gift-status. 51 To term a payment a gift, there must be no legal or moral obliga-
tion to make the payment. 2 There must be no anticipation of economic benefit
45. Id. at 246.
46. 363 U.S. at 285. This requirement was further elucidated by defining such a pay-
ment as springing "'out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses.'" Ibid.,
quoting from Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952).
47. See, e.g., Estate of W. R. Olsen, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 807, 810 (1961), rev'd, 302
F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); Mildred W. Smith, 20 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 775, 779 (1961), aff'd, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962);
Irving B. Cooper, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 774 (1961); Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, 35
T.C. 65, 68 (1960), rev'd sub nom. Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962).
48. 363 U.S. at 283-84. See also the sister case to Duberstein, United States v. Kaiser,
363 U.S. 299 (1960), where voluntary strike assistance given by a union to a striking non-
member was held to be a gift.
49. Duberstein v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1959) (reversing tax court
finding of compensation for services rendered).
50. Stanton v. United States, 268 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1959) (reversing district court
finding of a gift).
51. 363 U.S. at 285-86. The Court prefaced its discussion with a reminder that a gift
under the tax statute is viewed more strictly than "gift" in the common-law sense of the
word. Id. at 285.
52. See Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937). See also Fritzel v. United
States, 339 F.2d 995 (7th Cir. 1964); Tomlinson v. I-line, 329 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1964);
Estate of Cronheim v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Meyer v. United States,
244 F. Supp. 103 (S.D. Cal. 1965); Spear v. Vinal, 240 F. Supp. 33 (D. Neb. 1965); Froeh-
linger v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 13 (D. Md. 1963), aff'd, 331 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1964).
In Corasanti v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 229, 232 (D. Md. 1962), the court noted the
difficulties presented to a well-meaning employer by the informal plan prohibition: "The
absence of a plan also supports that conclusion. Now that two key employees have been
treated in the same way it will no doubt be more difficult for the next widow, for the
government will argue an established practice and benefit to the corporation. This is but
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thereby, 53 and even if there is no such benefit, the payment cannot be in return
for services rendered. 54 There must be "a 'detached and disinterested generos-
ity,' " 5 which proceeds "'out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like
impulses.' "56 Most important, there must be, in the eyes of the court, the
requisite intention to make such a gift in the mind of the transferor.57 But the
Court did not limit inquiry to these questions. Rather, "the conclusion whether
a transfer amounts to a 'gift' is one that must be reached on consideration of all
the factors."5 8 In thus making the gift question solely one of fact,59 the Court
narrowly restricted the field of appellate review in the area:
Where a jury has tried the matter upon correct instructions, the only inquiry is
whether it can not be said that reasonable men could reach differing conclusions on
the issue .... Where the trial has been by a judge without a jury, the judge's finding
must stand unless "clearly erroneous." . . . "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." c0
On this basis, the Court found that the tax court's finding that the automobile
was not a gift was not "'clearly erroneous' "61 and thus must stand. The Court
found the district court's findings on the Trinity Church gratuity, however, too
incomplete for review and remanded that case for further proceedings.6 12
D. Post-Duberstein Decisions
1. The Tax Court
Following the Duberstein decision, a trend developed which was adverse to
the interests of the recipients of the payments. The effects of Duberstein were
one of the many unsatisfactory features of the present situation, which works inequalities
based upon more or less important incidents, more or less candid testimony, and more or
less sympathetic judges."
53. See Bogardus v. Commissioner, supra note 52, at 41. See also Fritzel v. United States,
supra note 52; Tomlinson v. Hine, supra note 52; Meyer v. United States, supra note 52;
Spear v. Vinal, supra note 52; Froehlinger v. United States, supra note 52; Carson v.
United States, 317 F.2d 370 (Ct. CI. 1963).
54. See Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952).
55. 363 U.S. at 285, citing Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 US. 243, 246 (1956).
56. 363 U.S. at 285, citing Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952). See
also note 52 supra, and cases cited therein.
57. See Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 43 (1937). The Court in Duberstein
took pains to distinguish this intent from the intent needed to make a common-law gift.
363 U.S. at 286; see note 48 supra.
58. 363 U.S. at 288.
59. This limits the Bogardus decision, which makes the question one of both law and
fact. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
60. 363 U.S. at 290-91. (Citations omitted.)
61. Id. at 291.
62. Id. at 292-93. On remand, the district court again determined that the payment was
a gift. Stanton v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1961).
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first noticeable in the tax court. In Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont,08 the tax
court, feeling that the resolution authorizing continuation of decedent's salary
indicated an intent to pay additional compensation, seized upon the lack of
evidence of generous motivation or compassion for the widow. It held that the
payment of the salary was taxable income to the widow.0 4 Again, in Estate of
Martin Kuntz, Sr.,05 the tax court relied on the lack of expressed sympathy for
the widow in the corporate resolution authorizing the payment 0 and held that
no gift was intended.
Further holdings denying gift treatment followed shortly.07 Estate of Irving
B. Cooper 8 reiterated the Pierpont maxim that continuation of the decedent's
salary and lack of evidence of a detached and disinterested generosity on the
part of the employer indicates an intention to pay additional compensation for
the decedent's services and will bar tax-free treatment for the widow. To the
detached and disinterested generosity requirement there was apparently added
in Mildred W. Smith 9 a requirement that the employer investigate the widow's
financial situation in order that any payment made be prompted by a desire to
assist the widow in her known financial need.70 In doing this, the tax court
shifted its emphasis from "intention" to "motive,"17 and thereby violated Duber-
stein's specific rejection of inquiry into motive. 72 Similar decisions followed, and
the tax court refused to stray from its apparently strict application of the
Duberstein criteria.7 3
63. 35 T.C. 65 (1960), rev'd sub nom. Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir.
1962).
64. 35 T.C. at 68-69.
65. 19 CCH Tax Ct. 1379 (1960), rev'd, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
903 (1962).
66. Id. at 1380. The resolution here also contained wording which indicated a definite
intention to preserve a deduction, even if it meant sacrificing tax-free treatment for the
recipient. Ibid. Thus, the case could very well have gone against the recipient if decided
prior to Duberstein.
67. Mary Fischer, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 318 (1961) (benefit to the employer); Estate
of Rose A. Russek, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 123 (1961) (benefit to the employer); Ivan
Y. Nickerson, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 1508 (1960) (disguised dividend).
68. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 774 (1961).
69. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 775 (1961).
70. Id. at 779. In Hagge v. Nelson, 18 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 66-5141 (ED. Wis. 1966),
the court, while affirming the necessity for investigation of the widow's needs in order
that the payment might be responsive to them, noted that her needs as discovered do not
in themselves control the gift question: "A gift may be made to a widow regardless of her
financial condition or he [sic] financial needs." Id. at 66-5559.
71. See Note, 49 Va. L. Rev. 74, 103 (1963).
72. 363 U.S. at 285, citing Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952). By
requiring that a gift proceed "'out of affection, respect, charity or like impulses,'" 363 U.S.
at 285, however, the Court made it almost impossible to disregard the employer's motivation
in making the payment.
73. See Edith L. Joyce, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 914 (1966); Estate of James J. Doumakes,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 1247 (1963); Lucile Mc Crea Evans, 39 T.C. 570 (1962), aff'd per
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2. The District Courts
The Duberstein principles had, at first, no noticeable effect in the district
courts.7 4 Although there were a few decisions holding against the widow, they
involved obvious cases of additional compensation.-5 After 1963, however, a
trend toward stricter application of the gift criteria had developed among the
districts. The first indication of this trend was the case of Froehlinger v. United
States.76 There, although evidence of an informal plan by the employer was an
important factor, the court emphasized a lack of inquiry by the employer into
the financial circumstances of the widow. 77 Duberstein was beginning to make
itself felt in the district courts. 78
Other districts also began to find in favor of the Commissioner, but in all of
these cases there was sufficient evidence of an informal plan so that the results,
if not the reasoning, of the decisions may not have been affected by Duber-
stein.79 Thus the trend, rather than being a reaction against gift treatment,
curiam, 330 F2d 518 (6th Cir. 1964); Margaret H. D. Penick, 37 T.C. 999 (1962); Estate
of Louis Rosen, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 316 (1962) ; Mary C. Westphal, 37 T.C. 340 (1961) ;
Roy I. Martin, 36 T.C. 556 (1961), aff'd, 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 US. 904
(1962); Estate of Julius B. Cronheim, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1144 (1961), aff'd, 323 F.2d
706 (8th Cir. 1963); Estate of W. R. Olsen, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 807 (1961), rev'd, 302
F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962). Most of these cases involved a con-
tinuation of the decedent's salary and a lack of disinterested generosity and affection for
the widow. For a more detailed discussion of some of the cases, see Note, 49 Va. L. Rev.
74, 103-09 (1963). Cf. Helen Rich Findlay, 39 T.C. 580, 595-96 (1962). But see Estate of
Enyart, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1447 (1965), where the tax court found the required detached
and disinterested generosity and ruled a $10,000 payment a gift.
74. See Corasanti v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 229 (D. Aid. 1962); Pixton v. United
States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,796 (S.D. Ala. 1962), af'd, 326 F.2d 626 (Sth Cir. 1964);
Schwarz v. United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,719 (NJ). Tex. 1962); Palmer v. Mathis,
62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,607 (E.D. Ark. 1962); Rice v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 223
(E.D. Wis. 1961), 35 Temple L.Q. 215 (1962); Wilner v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 786
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Frankel v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961), aff'd, 302
F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); Cowan v. United States, 191 F.
Supp. 703 (ND. Ga. 1960).
75. In Gaugler v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), payment of the
remainder of the decedent's yearly salary was made to the widow in accordance with an
informal plan of making such payments to the widows of deceased executives. The direc-
tors of the employer corporation stipulated that benefit would thereby accrue to company
morale and that failure to make the payments would cause detrimental side-effects to
the corporation's reputation and to their future attempts to hire or retain executives. Id.
at 497. In Hein v. United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,336 (ED. Wis. 1962), the employer's
president admitted that the payment was never intended to be a gift. Id. at 85,338.
76. 217 F. Supp. 13 (D. Md. 1963). Five months prior to this decision, the same district
had ruled in favor of the widow. Corasanti v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 229 (D. 11d. 1962).
77. The requirement that the employer investigate the widow's needs sheds more light
on motive than on intention but results nevertheless from the Duberstein criteria. See
notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
78. Cf. Carson v. United States, 317 F.2d 370 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
79. See Meyer v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 103 (S.D. Cal. 1965); Spear v. Vinal, 240
1967]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
was merely the enforcement of more stringent prerequisites to gaining such
treatment. This theory is supported by a number of district court holdings in
favor of the recipients of the payments during the same period. 80
In Titchener v. United States,8 ' a jury returned a verdict favorable to the
widow. The judge had charged them to the effect that the employer's deduction
of the payments was evidence that no gift was intended,82 and he had reminded
them that they must find detached or disinterested generosity, affection, or
like motives on the part of the employer.8 3 Their verdict indicates that they found
the proper gift-making intention in light of these and other Duberstein criteria.
In Greely v. United States,84 although the employee's widow became a director
of the employer-corporation subsequent to the passing of the resolution author-
izing the payments, and although the corporation later claimed that the pay-
ment was compensation rather than a gift when it sought and obtained de-
ductibility for the payment on its own return, the court found a gift-making
intention by the corporation and allowed gift treatment for the widow, in light
of the dominant intention of the employer at the time the payment was made. 8
The most obvious recent example of the district court's continuous willingness
to find in favor of the recipient is Fanning v. Conley." There the court sifted
through the mass of relevant facts, some of them clear evidence of a non-gift
making intention, to find that "the primary objective was to help [the] .. .
widow"87 and thus accorded gift treatment to the widow. The court found
this intention overrode such adverse indications as the resolution's calling for
a "salary continuation,"8 8 payment by payroll check, the employer's seeking of
a deduction, the employer's failure to investigate her needs (she was in fact
quite well-off), and the employer's expectation of a boon to company morale."
However, there were other very definite indications of a gift-making intention,
and the court's decision was justified on the entirety of the evidence.90 In thus
weighing all factors to reach a fair estimate of the employer's intention, the
Fanning court seems to have been the first to establish a workable "dominant
reason" test, as stated by Duberstein: "We take it that the proper criterion...
is one that inquires what the basic reason for his conduct was in fact-the
F. Supp. 33, 35 (D. Neb. 1965) (some reliance on employer's accounting treatment of
payment as salary expense) ; McCarthy v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 605 (D. Mass. 1964).
80. See notes 81-92 infra and accompanying text.
81. 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 94,869 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
82. Id. at 94,873.
83. Id. at 94,872.
84. 247 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mont. 1965).
85. Id. at 46-47.
86. 243 F. Supp. 683 (D. Conn. 1965), aft'd, 357 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1966).
87. Id. at 686.
88. Id. at 685.
89. Id. at 685-86.
90. The directors had personal affection for the widow and wanted "to 'ease the emo-
tional burden' of her loss." Id. at 686. The payments were not charged to the employer's
books as compensation but as "'Miscellaneous Expenses.'" Ibid.
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dominant reason that explains his action in making the transfer." D1 This ap-
proach has led to an ever-increasing number of decisions favorable to the re-
cipients of these payments.92
3. The Circuit Courts
A number of decisions handed down from the circuit courts subsequent to
Duberstein showed no marked signs of that decision's influence.0 3 Then, in
Poyner v. Commissioner,94 the Fourth Circuit, while remanding the case to
enable the widow to comply with post-Duberstein criteria, recognized several
new tests proposed by the tax court as valid methods of interpreting the widow's
payments. The court first mentioned the continuing need to consider the five
pre-Duberstein factors as set forth in Florence S. Luntz: 5
(1) the payments had been made to the wife of the deceased employee and not
to his estate; 96 (2) there was no obligation on the part of the corporation to pay
any additional compensation to the deceased employee; (3) the corporation derived
no benefit from the payment; (4) the wife of the deceased employee performed
no services for the corporation; and (5) the services of her husband had been fully
compensated. 97
The court acknowledged the lower courts' right to investigate additional factors
and approved three such factors: inquiry into the widow's stockholdings in the
employer company, the employer's investigation of her financial situation, and
the employer's knowledge of her needs.9 8 These eight factors, combined with
91. 363 U.S. at 286.
92. See Mather v. United States, P-H 1967 Fed. Tax Serv. (19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 488)
67-343 (NJ). Ala. Dec. 8, 1966); Hagge v. Nelson, P-H 1966 Fed. Tax Serv. (18 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 5558) 1 66-5141 (E.D. Wis. June 14, 1966); Wink v. Foley, P-H 1966 Fed.
Tax Serv. (18 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5559) ff 66-5142 (W.D.N.Y. 1966); Morrow v. United
States, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. (66-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9415 (N.D. Ala. 1966). But see Security
First Nat'l Bank v. United States, P-H 1966 Fed. Tax Serv. (18 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5586)
1 66-5152 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 1966). The Commissioner also showed the weakness of his
position by settling one case before trial for the full amount of the taxpayer's claim. See
Fouke Fur Co. v. Bookwalter, CCH Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (67-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) t 9121,
at 83061-62 (1966).
93. Martin v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962);
Olsen's Estate v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962);
United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962);
Kuntz's Estate v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962).
But see Smith v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962).
The Smith and Martin cases were decided in favor of the Commissioner, but only in Smith
was there a hint of stricter application of the gift requirements.
94. 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962).
95. 29 T.C. 647 (1958).
96. Contra, Estate of Frank J. Foote, 28 T.C. 547 (1957).
97. Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 1962), quoting from Florence
S. Luntz, 29 T.C. 647, 650 (1958). (Footnote added.)
98. Poyner v. Commissioner, supra note 97, at 292.
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the "detached and disinterested generosity" requirement of Duberstein,99 form
the basis for all determinations of intention in these gift cases today.'00
Other circuits have followed Poyner, but the importance of their decisions
has been somewhat limited by the narrow scope of appellate review permitted
them by Duberstein. As a rule, they have affirmed the lower courts' holdings, 10'
and as a result many circuits have decided both for and against the widow in
recent years.10 2 Although there have been some reversals, 03 it appears that
the crucial determinations on the gift question will continue to be made in the
lower courts.
III. DEDUCTIBILITY
If the employer chooses to treat the payment as income to the widow rather
than as a gift, he must take care to assure himself a deduction in order to avoid
a situation where both he and the widow will be taxed on the same sum. This
task, though not as difficult as that of obtaining gift treatment for the recipient,
is still fraught with enough pitfalls to dictate caution. The recent enactment
of section 274(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954104 makes it a necessary
prerequisite of deductibility that the recipient of the payment cannot exclude
it from his gross income as a gift.
The payments are deductible under section 404 (a) (5) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954 if they are a continuation of decedent's salary'01 and can be
shown to be ordinary and necessary business expenditures.' 00 "Ordinary" means
the ordinary practice of the business community and does not require the em-
ployer himself to have made such payments in the past.10 7 Since such payments
99. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
100. See Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287, 291-92 (4th Cir. 1964).
101. E.g., Fanning v. Conley, 357 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1966), affirming 243 F. Supp. 683
(D. Conn. 1965); Greentree v. United States, 338 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), affirming 64-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. f1 9284 (D. Va. 1964); Evans v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1964),
affirming 39 T.C. 570 (1962) ; United States v. Pixton, 326 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1964), affirm-
ing 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9686 (S.D. Ala. 1962).
102. See, e.g., Second Circuit: Fanning v. Conley, 357 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1966) (for
widow); Gaugler v. United States, 312 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1963) (against widow); Eighth
Circuit: Cronheim's Estate v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1963) (against widow);
United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962) (for
widow).
103. E.g., Fritzel v. United States, 339 F.2d 995 (7th Cir.), reversing 64-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. ff 9178 (D. Ill. 1964); Tomlinson v. lIine, 329 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1964), reversing
63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9142 (D. Fla. 1962).
104. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 274(b): "No deduction shall be allowed . . . for gifts ...
to the extent that such expense . . . exceeds $25. . . . '[Glift' means any item excludable
from gross income of the recipient under section 102 . .. ."
105. See Harry L. Davis Co., 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1043, 1045 (1961). There must
be a relationship between the payments and decedent's salary to make them a continuation
of salary, but the payments need not be as large as his salary. Ida Maltzman, 23 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 829 (1964).
106. See Treas. Reg. § 1A04(a)-12 (1960). See also Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a).
107. Loewy Drug Co. v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 143, 148 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd,
356 F.2d 928 (4th Cir. 1966); Vesuvius Crucible Co., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 750, 751 (1965).
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are relatively common today, the requirement that they be ordinary does not
present a problem in seeking deductibility. To be "necessary," the payment
must serve a business end and it must be made by the employer with the inten-
tion of serving that end.10 8
An informal plan'0 9 to compensate the families of employees on their deaths
if they are not adequately provided for by pension plans or insurance is recog-
nized by the courts as a necessary expense. For "it is sufficient if the payments
are made as an incentive to the other officers or employees, in order to improve
their morale or otherwise benefit the corporation."110 Of course, such benefit
will be shown to accrue only where the payment and the employer's intention are
publicized within the company'1 ' and where some other circumstance, such as
impending liquidation,"' does not negate the possibility of any benefit.
Once it has been shown that payments give rise to an economic benefit for
the corporation, they will be deductible to the extent that they are reasonable in
light of that purpose. The question of reasonableness of compensation is one of
fact and has no well-defined resolution. 1 3 It extends to the duration of the
payments 1 4 as well as to their size. While there is no established limitation, con-
tinuation of the decedent's full salary for a period of about two years has gen-
erally been held to be reasonable.'1,
If the intended recipient of the payment has substantial holdings of the em-
ployer's stock, care must be taken that the payment is clearly differentiated
from dividends, or the deduction will be lost.116
In general, then, these payments, which may be funded by insurance," 7 are
deductible by the employer if they lead to economic benefit and are reasonable
in relation to that benefit.
108. Loewy Drug Co. v. United States, supra note 107, at 148.
109. No legal obligation, as there would be under a formal plan, is required. Champion
Spark Plug Co., 30 T.C. 295, 298 (1958), aff'd, 266 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1959).
110. Loewy Drug Co. v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 143, 148 (D. Bid. 1964), afI'd,
356 F.2d 928 (4th Cir. 1966).
111. E. R. Wagner Mfg. Co. v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 969, 975 (E.D. Wis. 1964).
112. See Loewy Drug Co. v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 143, 145 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd,
356 F.2d 928 (4th Cir. 1966).
113. See generally 3 P-H 1967 Fed. Tax Serv. U 11541.
114. This factor was of particular importance under the old law, when the payments
could be deducted by the corporation and excluded by the widow. The time limit varied
from case to case. E.g., William H. Swan & Sons, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 105 (1955)
(40 months, but under agreement, though not binding); Bleichroeder, Bing & Co., 12
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 117 (1953) (20 years, though under oral agreement); I. Putnam,
Inc., 15 T.C. 86 (1950) (24 months); McLaughlin Gormley King Co., 11 T.C. 569 (1948)
(29 months). An agreement with the deceased, however, does not assure deductibility. See
Donald J. Wallace, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. (26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.) 1967-11 (Jan. 27, 1967).
115. See cases cited note 114 supra.
116. See Nickerson Lumber Co. v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mass. 1963);
Jordanos' Inc., CCH Tax Ct. Rep. (25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1127) 1966-218 (Sept. 30, 1966);
But see John B. Canepa Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1770 (1963).
117. Gibson & Roberts, Inc. v. United States, 10 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5451 (E.D. Wash.
1962).
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IV. CONCLUSION
There can be at present no definitive answer to the questions posed by the
gift cases. The tax court has apparently aligned itself solidly with the Commis-
sioner. Estate of Frederick J. Meyer," 8 a case now pending before the tax
court, contains many elements favorable to the widow's cause. The payment
there in question bore no relation to decedent's salary, and the proper words
of respect and affection were present in the resolution. The corporation's board
did apparently act in a highly emotional state, and their alleged intention was
to ease the " 'emotional burden' "119 of the widow's loss. However, there was a
direction of these magnanimous feelings primarily toward the decedent, at least
as set forth in the resolution. And there is no investigation of the widow's needs
alleged. Admitting this to be a relatively strong case for the widow, 2 0 one still
must recognize the probability of an adverse decision. If the court decides not
to treat the payments involved as gifts, it will be evident that each of the gift
criteria must be strictly complied with before gift treatment will be possible in
the tax court.
However, there remains the possibility of paying the tax deficiency assessed
by the Commissioner and then suing to recover it in a district court.121 Al-
though the law is far from settled in these courts, there is at least a reasonable
opportunity for success therein. The unsettling intrusion of Duberstein has
naturally led to some confusion as the courts revamped their reasoning to con-
form to its principles. 122 But Duberstein never purported to do away with such
gifts entirely. And in seeking an adequate method to determine the status of
these payments, the district courts may emerge from the morass of conflicting
decisions with a workable rule, namely, the "dominant reason" rule.128 Under
this rule all the evidence is considered and weighed for total import rather than
searched for non-compliance with highly formalized requirements.
This, however, can still best be complied with by conforming to the require-
ments set out in Duberstein and Poyner.124 A proper gift would be in proportion
to the widow's needs as discovered through an investigation of her finances,
rather than by a mere continuation of her husband's salary.'2 5 To emphasize
this direction of the payment to the widow, the resolution authorizing the pay-
ment should mention the investigation, recite the widow's needs therein dis-
118. No. 4543-66, filed Aug. 9, 1966.
119. CCH Tax Ct. Rep. f1 5137, at 8245 (Jan. 6, 1967).
120. See id. at 8243-45.
121. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7422.
122. "There is far from uniform application by the courts throughout the country of
what they have indicated are 'relevant factors' . . . . It appears to this court to be un-
fortunate that there are not specific rules, guide lines or standards to be applied In the
determination of whether payments to surviving widows of an officer or business employee
are to be deemed gifts within the tax statute." Meyer v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 103,
109 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
123. See text accompanying notes 86-92 supra.
124. These requirements are set forth in text accompanying notes 95-100 supra.
125. See, e.g., Cronheim's Estate v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1963).
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covered, and, while noting that the employer is in no way responsible for her
situation, evidence a desire to spare her the burden of those needs during her
period of bereavement. 126 A generous and affectionate tone should pervade the
resolution.12 7 To avoid the implication of compensation, the payments should
be made directly to the widow and not to her husband's estate; they should
not be made on payroll checks; they should be made separately from any re-
maining compensation which is due decedent; and they should be entered on
the corporate books as gifts rather than salary or business expenses. 128 No de-
duction should be taken by the employer on his own tax returns, for these gifts
are no longer deductible in excess of $25, although an additional $5,000 may
be deducted when that amount is excludable by the widow as a death benefit.'"
Such deduction, which heretofore has been evidence that the payments were
not intended as gifts,130 is now, in light of the new gift deduction limitation,
strong evidence of a non-gift-making intent. If the employer is an individual, 131
a gift tax return should be filed if the payment is over $3,000, whether or not
any tax is actually due thereon. 132 Substantial holdings of the employer's stock
by the widow will almost certainly bar gift treatment, and some other method
of providing for her must be found. A slight boost in company morale is almost
inevitable in these cases and the expectation of it will not by itself exclude the
possibility of making a gift. Such expectations should never be emphasized,
however. Indeed, once such payments become so numerous that employees begin
to expect similar benefits themselves and work for them, an informal plan exists,
and a gift is no longer possible.133
Although the making of a gift is still possible, the spectre of creating an
informal plan makes it an unfeasible method for providing for employees' wid-
ows as a company policy. It should be used only in those isolated instances where
an employee dies, his widow is in need, and no adequate provision has been
made for her. Even in that instance, if a deduction can be assured for the em-
ployer, the advantage of certainty might dictate the making of a larger pay-
126. See, e.g., Greentree v. United States, 338 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1964).
127. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
128. Methods such as these avoid inadvertently providing evidence that payment of
compensation was intended. See also Yohlin, Payments to Widows of Employees or Execu-
tives, in Taxation of Deferred Employee and Executive Compensation 82, 102 (Sellin ed.
1960).
129. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 101(b), 274(b). For a discussion of the possibility of
receiving this additional $5,000 deduction see 3 P-H 1967 Fed. Tax Serv. U 11771, at
11413-14.
130. See Titchener v. United States, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. U 9222, at 94873 (E.D Z.C. 1964).
131. A gift tax "is not applicable to transfers by corporations or persons other than in-
dividuals." Treas. Reg. § 25.0-1(b) (1958). But see Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(1).
132. See WVimk v. Foley, P-H 1966 Fed. Tax Serv. (18 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5559, 5560)
I 66-5142, at 66-5560 (W.D.N.Y. 1966).
133. If employees do strive for such death payments, the employer will receive the
benefit of their additional efforts. Since under Florence S. Luntz, 29 T.C. 647, 650 (1958),
the employer must have "derived no benefit from the payment," gift treatment will be
barred.
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